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Introduction	  by	  Jacob	  Darwin	  Hamblin,	  Oregon	  State	  University	  	  s	  Maximum	  Sustainable	  Yield	  a	  tool	  of	  science	  or	  of	  diplomacy?	  For	  the	  world’s	  fish	  populations,	  the	  concept	  has	  stood	  for	  years	  as	  a	  working	  blend	  of	  economic	  goals	  and	  conservation	  principles.	  The	  word	  “sustainable”	  lends	  it	  a	  particular	  respectability	  in	  our	  environmental	  age.	  	  It	  purports	  to	  answer	  the	  burning	  question	  about	  how	  many	  fish	  can	  reasonably	  be	  taken	  from	  the	  sea	  when	  their	  numbers	  are	  dwindling	  and	  many	  vessels,	  from	  many	  different	  nations,	  all	  want	  a	  piece	  of	  the	  action.	  	  MSY	  suggests	  that	  scientists	  possess	  the	  expertise	  to	  predict	  the	  largest	  catch	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  from	  a	  species’	  total	  stock	  without	  threatening	  its	  survival.	  	  	  	  Despite	  this	  so-­‐called	  “sustainable”	  practice,	  there	  have	  been	  numerous	  crashes	  in	  marine	  life	  populations.	  Many	  scientists	  have	  criticized	  MSY	  for	  providing	  an	  unrealistic	  view,	  not	  taking	  into	  account	  important	  variables	  in	  fisheries	  management.	  	  Yet	  the	  concept	  continues	  to	  stand	  at	  the	  core	  of	  contemporary	  American	  management	  practices.	  	  In	  All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea,	  Carmel	  Finley	  is	  unambiguous:	  Maximum	  Sustainable	  Yield	  is	  policy,	  masked	  as	  science.	  	  It	  dovetailed	  extremely	  well	  with	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  State	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  as	  American	  fishing	  interests	  tried	  to	  find	  a	  scientific	  basis	  for	  extending	  their	  dominance	  in	  waters	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  Using	  MSY	  as	  a	  guide,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  justify	  fishing	  far	  in	  excess	  of	  what	  some	  scientists	  recommended	  and	  what	  many	  other	  states	  wished.	  	  Our	  first	  commentator	  is	  Sayuri	  Guthrie-­‐Shimizu,	  the	  Dunlevie	  Family	  Chair	  of	  History	  at	  Rice	  University	  .	  	  Like	  Finley,	  she	  has	  explored	  the	  connections	  between	  fisheries	  and	  the	  history	  of	  international	  affairs,	  specifically	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Region.	  In	  her	  book	  Creating	  People	  of	  Plenty,	  Guthrie-­‐Shimizu	  examined	  trade	  policy	  in	  the	  immediate	  postwar	  period	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  to	  turn	  Japan	  not	  only	  into	  a	  Cold	  War	  ally,	  but	  a	  nation	  whose	  economic	  foundations	  were	  distinctly	  pro-­‐capitalist.1	  	  
Arthur	  F.	  McEvoy,	  the	  Paul	  E.	  Treusch	  Professor	  of	  Law	  at	  Southwestern	  Law	  School,	  is	  well-­‐known	  to	  environmental	  historians	  of	  the	  oceans	  because	  of	  his	  1986	  book	  The	  Fisherman’s	  Problem.	  While	  studying	  Californian	  fisheries,	  McEvoy	  told	  a	  tale	  of	  repeated	  failures	  of	  public	  agencies	  to	  take	  useful	  steps	  to	  stop	  the	  depletion	  of	  fish.	  	  His	  analysis	  focused	  on	  the	  interplay	  between	  ecology,	  economics,	  and	  the	  law.	  Like	  Finley,	  he	  saw	  serious	  flaws	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  MSY,	  particularly	  because	  it	  rested	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  stocks	  of	  fish	  existed	  in	  isolation	  from	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Sayuri	  Shimizu,	  Creating	  People	  of	  Plenty:	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Japan’s	  Economic	  
Alternatives,	  1950-­‐1960	  (Kent	  State	  University	  Press,	  2001).	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environments,	  with	  little	  thought	  devoted	  to	  more	  complex	  ecological	  relationships.2	  	  
Bo	  Poulsen	  is	  Associate	  Professor	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Culture	  and	  Global	  Studies	  at	  Aalborg	  University,	  Denmark.	  	  He	  brings	  to	  this	  roundtable	  not	  only	  a	  European	  perspective	  but	  also	  expertise	  on	  fisheries	  politics	  in	  the	  North	  Atlantic.	  As	  an	  environmental	  historian,	  Poulsen	  has	  used	  historical	  scientific	  data	  to	  investigate	  how	  changes	  to	  the	  natural	  environment	  may	  have	  influenced	  fish	  in	  the	  distant	  past,	  particularly	  North	  Sea	  herring	  stocks	  in	  the	  early	  modern	  era.3	  	  Our	  final	  commentator,	  Michael	  J.	  Chiarrapa,	  is	  Associate	  Professor	  of	  History	  at	  Quinnipiac	  University.	  	  Much	  of	  his	  work	  blends	  marine	  environmental	  history	  with	  architectural	  history.	  He	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  fisheries	  architecture	  and	  fisheries	  landscapes	  deserve	  greater	  scrutiny	  by	  scholars,	  because	  of	  what	  they	  reveal	  about	  cultural	  values.	  	  In	  a	  recent	  essay	  in	  Environmental	  History,	  for	  example,	  he	  called	  upon	  historians	  to	  integrate	  buildings,	  boats,	  and	  other	  fisheries	  infrastructure	  more	  substantially	  into	  their	  work,	  because	  these	  are	  spaces	  at	  the	  threshold	  of	  the	  land-­‐water	  continuum	  where	  discourse	  about	  nature	  is	  created.4	  	  Before	  turning	  to	  the	  first	  set	  of	  comments,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  pause	  here	  and	  thank	  all	  the	  roundtable	  participants	  for	  taking	  part.	  	  In	  addition,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  remind	  readers	  that	  as	  an	  open-­‐access	  forum,	  H-­‐Environment	  Roundtable	  Reviews	  is	  available	  to	  scholars	  and	  non-­‐scholars	  alike,	  around	  the	  world,	  free	  of	  charge.	  Please	  circulate.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Arthur	  F.	  McEvoy,	  The	  Fisherman’s	  Problem:	  Ecology	  and	  Law	  in	  the	  California	  Fisheries,	  
1850-­‐1980	  (Cambridge,	  1986).	  3	  Bo	  Poulsen,	  Dutch	  Herring:	  An	  Environmental	  History,	  c.	  1600-­‐1860	  (Amsterdam	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  4	  Michael	  J.	  Chiarappa,	  “Dockside	  Landings	  and	  Threshold	  Spaces:	  Reckoning	  Architecture’s	  Place	  in	  Marine	  Environmental	  History,”	  Environmental	  History	  18:1	  (2013),	  12-­‐28.	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Comments	  by	  Sayuri	  Guthrie-­‐Shimizu,	  Rice	  University	  	   The	  Strange	  Career	  of	  MSY	  	  ndeed	  there	  is	  more	  to	  the	  fish	  (and	  the	  oceans	  that	  harbor	  them)	  than	  meets	  the	  eye.	  That	  is	  the	  central	  takeaway	  of	  Carmel	  Finley’s	  meticulously	  researched	  book	  chronicling	  the	  rise	  of	  MSY	  (Maximum	  Sustainable	  Yield)	  as	  the	  “scientific”	  concept	  that	  did	  much	  to	  (mis)shape	  international	  fisheries	  regulation	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  Finley’s	  wonderfully	  braided	  story	  tells	  us	  how	  fish	  science	  and	  oceanography	  informed,	  and	  often	  misdirected,	  incipient	  efforts	  to	  build	  international	  mechanisms	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  fish	  stock	  depletion.	  She	  is	  most	  effective	  in	  showing	  how	  politicized	  that	  institution-­‐building	  process	  was	  throughout	  the	  critical	  decades	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  International	  Technical	  Conference	  on	  the	  Conservation	  of	  the	  Living	  Resources	  of	  the	  Sea	  held	  in	  1955	  in	  Rome.	  Highly	  readable,	  the	  book	  succinctly	  explains	  to	  the	  lay	  reader	  the	  arcana	  of	  fish	  in	  crisp	  and	  engaging	  prose	  without	  an	  ounce	  of	  condescension.	  Finley	  does	  an	  equally	  good	  job	  of	  shining	  a	  spotlight	  on	  the	  dark	  corners	  of	  diplomacy	  that	  involved	  not	  only	  government	  officials	  and	  agents	  of	  domestic	  special	  interest	  groups	  but	  also	  supposedly	  impartial	  scientific	  experts	  dedicated	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  marine	  resources.	  The	  aggregate	  result	  of	  her	  multifarious	  narrative	  skills	  is	  a	  startling	  and	  thought-­‐provoking	  tale	  laying	  bare	  the	  international	  politics	  of	  knowledge	  production,	  the	  often	  highly	  negotiated	  nature	  of	  what	  prevails	  as	  “science,”	  the	  enormous	  challenges	  involved	  in	  international	  governance	  for	  common	  property	  resources,	  and	  a	  shift,	  indeed	  a	  sea	  change,	  in	  the	  global	  maritime	  order	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  mixed	  record	  in	  that	  historical	  process.	  	  	  One	  is	  prone	  to	  assume	  that,	  as	  practitioners	  of	  “objective”	  natural	  science,	  marine	  biologists	  and	  oceanographers,	  working	  in	  relatively	  new	  academic	  fields	  that	  cohered	  as	  a	  community	  of	  experts	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  would	  be	  well	  equipped	  to	  create	  the	  kind	  of	  “epistemic	  community”	  that	  International	  Relations	  theorist	  Peter	  Haas	  and	  others	  have	  envisioned	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  global	  governance.5	  Finley,	  however,	  shows	  that	  the	  world	  of	  fisheries	  regulation	  driven	  by	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  decades	  was	  anything	  but	  scientifically	  communitarian.	  True,	  it	  consisted	  of	  groups	  and	  experts	  institutionally	  autonomous	  from	  the	  sovereign	  state;	  they	  were	  bound	  by	  their	  shared	  commitment	  to	  finding	  policy	  solutions	  to	  a	  common	  problem	  and	  to	  assessing	  policy	  outcomes	  to	  refine	  the	  original	  prescriptions.	  Those	  experts	  even	  upheld	  shared	  values	  that	  transcended	  narrowly	  bounded	  national	  interests.	  But	  they	  remained	  mired	  in	  a	  highly	  politicized	  field,	  failing	  to	  create	  a	  functioning	  epistemic	  community	  in	  the	  end,	  with	  disturbingly	  long-­‐term	  negative	  implications	  for	  the	  marine	  environment	  they	  sought	  to	  safeguard.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Haas,	  Peter	  M.	  “Epistemic	  Communities	  and	  International	  Policy	  Coordination.”	  
International	  Organization.	  Vol.	  46.	  No.	  1.	  Winter	  (1992),	  1-­‐35.	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In	  her	  discussion	  of	  the	  surprising	  flimsiness	  of	  MSY	  as	  a	  scientific	  concept,	  Finlay	  points	  to	  the	  “scientific	  racism”	  beneath	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  American	  public	  officials	  and	  scientists	  concerned	  with	  fisheries	  regulation	  at	  mid-­‐century.	  They	  long	  held	  the	  notion,	  or	  even	  truism	  as	  it	  were,	  that	  Japanese	  fish	  science	  was	  at	  best	  woefully	  lacking	  by	  Western	  standards	  of	  scientific	  rigor,	  and	  at	  worst	  nonexistent.	  In	  fact,	  Finley	  argues,	  Japan,	  because	  of	  its	  dependence	  on	  marine	  living	  resources,	  had	  a	  long	  and	  venerable	  history	  of	  studying	  fish	  stocks	  and	  their	  husbandry	  going	  back	  to	  the	  industrialization	  of	  the	  nation’s	  inshore	  and	  coastal	  fisheries	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Japan	  was	  also	  a	  respected	  source	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  inchoate	  fish	  science	  sought	  by	  other	  nations	  from	  the	  1930s	  on,	  including	  the	  United	  States.	  None	  other	  than	  the	  Natural	  Resource	  Section	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Commander	  for	  the	  Allies	  Powers	  (SCAP)	  was	  among	  those	  who	  depended	  on	  the	  data	  on	  fish	  stocks	  accumulated	  by	  Japanese	  experts.	  And	  yet	  American	  stakeholders	  such	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Cordell	  Hull	  (involved	  in	  the	  1936–7	  US-­‐Japanese	  dispute	  over	  Alaskan	  salmon)	  and	  Wilbert	  Chapman,	  the	  fish	  scientist	  turned	  main	  architect	  of	  postwar	  US	  fisheries	  policy,	  were	  steadfast	  in	  their	  dismissal	  of	  and	  disdain	  for	  Japanese	  fish	  science	  and	  the	  data	  it	  produced.	  Works	  by	  historians	  of	  Japanese	  fisheries	  such	  as	  Yoshitaka	  Takahashi	  attest	  that	  Finley	  is	  right:	  Japan	  had	  indeed	  developed	  a	  sophisticated	  administrative	  system	  of	  fisheries	  management	  based	  on	  systematic	  accumulation	  of	  data	  even	  before	  Japan	  was	  “forced	  open”	  by	  Commodore	  Matthew	  Perry	  and	  famously	  exposed	  to	  the	  benefits	  of	  Western	  science	  and	  technology.6	  Another	  interesting	  point	  Finley	  makes	  about	  various	  iterations	  of	  American	  racism	  or	  ethnocentrism	  tainting	  the	  views	  of	  American	  scientists	  and	  practitioners	  is	  that	  the	  United	  States	  vilified	  the	  efforts	  by	  Central	  American	  coastal	  nations	  such	  as	  Ecuador	  and	  Peru	  to	  curb	  American	  bait	  fishing	  off	  their	  shores	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  extract	  a	  “tribute”	  from	  US	  fishermen,	  and	  they	  refused	  to	  regard	  such	  control	  as	  a	  legitimate	  administrative	  prerogative	  exercised	  by	  sovereign	  states	  on	  a	  par	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Another	  feat	  achieved	  by	  Finley’s	  history	  of	  marine	  science	  is	  to	  complicate	  the	  familiar	  historical	  narratives	  of	  American	  foreign	  relations	  and	  Cold	  War–era	  power	  alignments.	  As	  a	  historian	  of	  US-­‐Japanese	  relations,	  I	  was	  delighted	  to	  see	  that	  Finley	  foregrounds	  a	  diplomatic	  drama	  other	  than	  Japan’s	  military	  misadventure	  in	  China	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  naval	  disarmament	  that	  fatefully	  contributed	  to	  the	  souring	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  in	  the	  late	  1930s.	  The	  US-­‐Japan	  showdown	  over	  Alaskan	  salmon	  (and	  all	  the	  associated	  problems	  of	  maritime	  jurisdiction	  and	  rights	  to	  extract	  resources	  in	  the	  high	  seas)	  has	  hardly,	  if	  ever,	  garnered	  mention	  in	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  US–East	  Asian	  relations.	  And	  yet	  it	  was	  actually	  a	  hair-­‐trigger	  conflict	  that	  perilously	  ratcheted	  up	  the	  racialized	  alarm	  many	  Americans,	  both	  policymakers	  in	  Washington	  and	  ordinary	  citizens	  in	  the	  West	  Coast	  states	  and	  Alaska,	  came	  to	  feel	  about	  a	  potential	  “Japanese	  invasion”	  that	  threatened	  the	  nation’s	  Pacific	  coastline.	  After	  all,	  the	  face-­‐off	  over	  Japanese	  harvesting	  of	  Alaskan	  salmon	  created	  a	  rare	  occasion	  in	  which	  actual	  shots	  were	  fired	  at	  Japanese	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Yoshitaka	  Takahashi,	  Shigenhanshoku	  no	  Jidai	  to	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  no	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nationals	  (including	  Issei	  fishermen	  operating	  out	  of	  US	  and	  Canadian	  ports)	  by	  angry	  Americans—fishermen	  trying	  to	  protect	  “our	  salmon”	  from	  the	  Japanese	  interlopers.	  	  	  Similarly,	  I	  applaud	  Finley	  for	  showing	  us	  international	  historians	  that	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  as	  the	  chief	  US	  negotiator	  for	  a	  Japanese	  peace	  treaty,	  twisted	  Prime	  Minister	  Shigeru	  Yoshida’s	  arm	  over	  separating	  postwar	  fisheries,	  not	  just	  the	  Chinese	  representation	  question,	  from	  multilateral	  World	  War	  II	  peacemaking.	  Just	  as	  Dulles	  exacted	  from	  a	  reluctant	  Yoshida	  a	  letter	  pledging	  that	  Tokyo	  would	  establish	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  outside	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Peace	  Treaty,	  the	  stern	  American	  chief	  negotiator,	  in	  consultation	  with	  chief	  State	  Department	  fisheries	  official	  Chapman,	  forced	  the	  Japanese	  government	  to	  acquiesce	  to	  a	  negotiation	  over	  Japan’s	  fishing	  activities	  separate	  from	  the	  San	  Francisco	  peace	  settlement.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  North	  Pacific	  High	  Seas	  Fisheries	  Convention,	  signed	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  and	  Japan	  in	  May	  1952.	  It	  was	  in	  this	  very	  first	  postwar	  treaty	  the	  Japanese	  government	  signed	  as	  a	  “sovereign	  state”	  redux	  that	  Tokyo	  swallowed	  the	  “abstention”	  doctrine	  governing	  high-­‐seas	  fisheries.	  In	  this	  highly	  unequal	  treaty,	  Japan,	  supposedly	  on	  its	  own	  volition,	  agreed	  to	  “abstain”	  from	  the	  commercial	  harvesting	  of	  certain	  fish	  species	  (salmon	  and	  halibut)	  in	  the	  high	  seas	  off	  Alaska	  and	  Canada.	  Finley	  masterfully	  shows	  that,	  here	  too,	  MSY	  was	  the	  diplomatic	  tool,	  not	  a	  scientific	  concept,	  deployed	  by	  American	  fisheries	  stakeholders	  such	  as	  Chapman	  to	  prevent	  the	  Japanese	  distant-­‐water	  fishing	  fleet	  from	  catching	  “their	  fish”—i.e.,	  Americans’	  and	  Canadians’—swimming	  in	  the	  high	  seas	  outside	  North	  American	  maritime	  jurisdictions.	  Thus,	  we	  now	  know	  that	  Yoshida	  had	  to	  write	  another	  “Yoshida	  letter”	  to	  Dulles,	  this	  one	  over	  fisheries,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Peace	  Treaty	  would	  be	  safely	  ratified	  by	  the	  US	  Senate.	  That	  the	  venue	  of	  the	  peace	  conference	  was	  one	  of	  the	  epicenters	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Japanese	  fisheries	  agitation	  on	  the	  West	  Coast	  and	  that	  senators	  such	  as	  William	  Knowland	  (R-­‐California)	  and	  Warren	  Magnuson	  (D-­‐Washington)	  had	  powerful	  fishing	  interests	  in	  their	  constituencies	  were	  hardly	  coincidences,	  I	  might	  add.	  	  Outside	  the	  bailiwick	  of	  US-­‐Japanese	  relations,	  Finley	  similarly	  upends	  with	  her	  “fish	  story”	  the	  storyline	  international	  historians	  are	  accustomed	  to.	  For	  example,	  she	  informs	  us	  how	  the	  United	  States	  saw	  its	  control	  begin	  to	  slip	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  three-­‐mile	  coastal	  jurisdiction—the	  bedrock	  of	  the	  freedom-­‐of-­‐the-­‐seas	  principle	  so	  dear	  to	  its	  national	  history—facing	  members	  of	  the	  Organization	  of	  American	  States	  (OAS).	  This	  happened	  at	  the	  very	  time	  when	  this	  first	  postwar	  regional	  alliance	  was	  a	  driver	  and	  manifestation	  of	  the	  intra-­‐hemispheric	  solidarity	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  able	  to	  command	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  years.	  When	  small	  coastal	  states	  such	  as	  Ecuador,	  Peru,	  and	  Chile	  joined	  Mexico	  in	  expanding	  their	  seaward	  jurisdictional	  claims	  in	  order	  to	  shield	  their	  offshore	  fish	  stocks	  from	  aggressive	  harvesting	  by	  capital-­‐rich	  high-­‐seas	  fishing	  nations	  spearheaded	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  United	  States’	  weakening	  hold	  on	  the	  international	  maritime	  order	  premised	  on	  the	  three-­‐mile	  coastal	  jurisdiction	  became	  ever	  more	  precarious.	  More	  interesting	  still,	  this	  “Western	  Hemisphere”	  revolt	  (reinforced	  by	  other	  small	  coastal-­‐state	  insurgents	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like	  Iceland	  and	  Denmark,	  both	  original	  members	  of	  NATO)	  first	  made	  its	  weight	  felt	  in	  forums	  provided	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  where	  the	  United	  States	  still	  enjoyed	  a	  commanding	  position.	  Washington	  unexpectedly	  found	  a	  strange	  bedfellow	  in	  Moscow	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  matter	  of	  expansive	  claims	  on	  high-­‐seas	  fisheries	  rights	  during	  the	  1950s,	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  no	  less.	  Friends	  and	  enemies	  often	  switched	  sides	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  battle	  took	  place	  on	  land	  or	  at	  sea.	  	  Finley’s	  exploration	  of	  international	  relations	  over	  fisheries	  also	  opens	  our	  eyes	  to	  the	  relentless	  resilience	  of	  American	  corporate	  capital	  seeking	  to	  profit	  from	  the	  commodification	  of	  the	  oceans’	  bounties.	  Finley	  notes	  that	  the	  Americans	  failed	  to	  stay	  abreast	  of	  the	  global	  trend	  toward	  catching	  and	  processing	  at	  sea	  in	  the	  1950s	  by	  investing	  in	  the	  distant-­‐fishing	  fleets	  operating	  on	  the	  mother-­‐ship	  processing	  model,	  but	  is	  it	  not	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  American	  fisheries	  capital	  simply	  elected	  to	  channel	  its	  resources	  elsewhere	  by	  resorting	  to	  direct	  foreign	  investment	  in	  canning	  and	  processing	  overseas?	  Here	  I	  am	  proposing	  a	  slightly	  different	  spin	  on	  what	  Finley	  reveals	  for	  us:	  that	  Central	  American	  fisheries	  such	  as	  the	  Peruvian	  anchovy	  industry	  grew	  exponentially	  in	  the	  postwar	  decades	  because	  of	  American	  money.	  Even	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  American	  corporate	  capital	  such	  as	  Van	  Camp	  profited	  handsomely	  by	  making	  clever	  use	  of	  Samoa	  as	  a	  tariff-­‐free	  haven	  where	  the	  company	  set	  up	  canneries	  to	  pack	  unprocessed	  fresh	  tuna	  caught	  by	  Japanese	  fishing	  boats	  worked	  by	  what	  was	  then	  dirt-­‐cheap	  Japanese	  labor.	  It	  is	  an	  amusingly	  creative	  business	  strategy	  given	  that	  American	  fisheries	  companies	  bitterly	  complained	  to	  officials	  at	  the	  General	  Agreement	  of	  Tariff	  and	  Trade	  (GATT)	  about	  the	  “cut-­‐rate”	  canned	  tuna	  imports	  from	  Japan	  flooding	  US	  markets!	  	  I	  want	  to	  raise	  a	  few	  questions	  that	  were	  left	  largely	  unexplored	  in	  Finley’s	  brilliant	  yet	  relatively	  short	  book,	  and	  I	  do	  so	  because	  it	  has,	  as	  all	  good	  pioneering	  works	  do,	  opened	  up	  for	  us	  a	  whole	  new	  field	  of	  questions.	  While	  I	  personally	  find	  convincing	  Finley’s	  argument	  about	  MSY’s	  problematic	  property	  as	  a	  scientific	  concept,	  I	  was	  left	  wanting	  to	  read	  more	  about	  how	  those	  fish	  scientists	  and	  oceanographers	  based	  outside	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  to	  counter	  the	  intellectual	  hegemony	  American	  scientists	  such	  as	  Chapman	  and	  his	  disciple	  William	  Herrington	  sought	  to	  impose	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  How	  did	  scientists	  other	  than	  Britain’s	  Michael	  Graham—for	  example,	  Japanese	  fish	  and	  conservation	  experts—argue	  against	  MSY	  by	  deploying	  their	  own	  “scientific”	  data	  and	  theories?	  The	  international	  fisheries	  conventions	  of	  the	  post–World	  War	  II	  era,	  such	  as	  the	  1949	  International	  Convention	  of	  North	  Atlantic	  Fisheries	  (ICNAF)	  and	  the	  1952	  North	  Pacific	  Fisheries	  Convention,	  created	  an	  advisory	  board	  of	  scientific	  experts	  and	  mandated	  it	  to	  meet	  and	  appraise	  collectively	  assembled	  data	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  These	  forums,	  I	  suspect,	  would	  have	  provided	  a	  revealing	  window	  into	  the	  contested	  and	  often	  politically	  tinged	  exchange	  of	  ideas	  over	  what	  constituted	  “scientific”	  data	  and	  theory	  and	  appropriate	  policy	  solutions	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  that	  body	  of	  knowledge.	  	  	  Another	  point	  on	  which	  I	  found	  myself	  wanting	  more	  was	  the	  role	  played	  by	  Canada	  in	  the	  historical	  processes	  chronicled	  in	  Finley’s	  book.	  Throughout	  her	  story,	  Canada	  makes	  occasional	  cameo	  appearances.	  As	  a	  key	  fishing	  nation,	  however,	  Canada	  was	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present	  at	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  first	  international	  fisheries	  management	  mechanism,	  the	  International	  Pacific	  Halibut	  Commission	  in	  1923,	  and	  has	  remained	  a	  key	  player	  in	  international	  fisheries	  governance	  ever	  since.	  In	  my	  own	  research	  on	  North	  Pacific	  fisheries	  diplomacy,	  I	  have	  been	  struck	  by	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  policy	  coordination	  between	  the	  two	  North	  American	  fishing	  superpowers,	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  With	  fisheries	  emerging	  as	  an	  avenue	  of	  wide-­‐ranging	  cross-­‐border	  economic	  policy	  consultation	  and	  coordination	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Canada	  often	  faced	  other	  contenders	  in	  international	  fisheries	  diplomacy	  with	  a	  united	  front,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  negotiations	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  1952	  North	  Pacific	  High	  Seas	  Fisheries	  Convention.	  Given	  this	  system	  of	  collaboration,	  one	  wonders	  what	  Canada’s	  role	  was	  in	  establishing	  and	  propagating	  MSY	  as	  the	  driver	  of	  international	  fisheries	  regulation	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  the	  1955	  Rome	  Conference.	  Were	  Canadian	  fish	  scientists	  complicit?	  If	  so,	  did	  that	  have	  anything	  to	  do	  with	  where	  they	  were	  trained	  in	  this	  new	  discipline	  of	  science?	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  capture	  in	  one	  book,	  even	  a	  study	  as	  multilateral	  as	  Finley’s,	  the	  historical	  forces	  emanating	  from	  all	  countries	  involved	  in	  this	  enduring	  common	  property	  problem—as	  impossible	  as	  catching	  all	  the	  fish	  in	  the	  sea.	  In	  that	  spirit,	  let	  me	  close	  my	  review	  with	  a	  prod	  to	  Finley	  for	  another	  book:	  after	  all,	  we	  know	  that	  there	  are	  plenty	  more	  fish	  in	  the	  sea	  (to	  write	  a	  book	  about,	  that	  is)!	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Comments	  by	  Arthur	  F.	  McEvoy,	  Southwestern	  Law	  School	  	  Maximum	  Sustainable	  Yield:	  A	  Laffer	  Curve	  for	  Fisheries	  
	  
ll	  The	  Fish	  In	  The	  Sea	  is	  a	  powerful	  book,	  with	  implications	  aplenty	  reaching	  far	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  fisheries	  management.	  	  The	  author	  is	  a	  historian	  of	  science	  who	  now	  teaches	  at	  Oregon	  State	  University;	  she	  was	  a	  freelance	  journalist	  writing	  on	  environmental	  issues	  before	  going	  to	  graduate	  school	  at	  UC	  San	  Diego	  and	  completing	  the	  dissertation	  from	  which	  the	  book	  developed.7	  	  I	  confess	  that	  I	  also	  wrote	  a	  dissertation	  on	  West	  Coast	  fisheries	  at	  UCSD,	  years	  ago,	  although	  the	  concision	  and	  the	  immediacy	  of	  Finley’s	  book	  puts	  my	  own	  to	  shame.	  	  The	  book	  deconstructs	  the	  dominant	  paradigm	  of	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  fisheries	  science	  –	  maximum	  sustainable	  yield	  –	  more	  effectively	  than	  any	  other	  writing	  with	  which	  I’m	  familiar,	  in	  any	  field.	  	  It	  rests	  on	  first-­‐class	  research	  into	  primary	  sources.	  	  It	  is	  literate	  in	  science,	  history,	  and	  politics.	  	  It	  has	  important	  things	  to	  say,	  not	  only	  about	  the	  politics	  of	  scientific	  inquiry	  but	  about	  the	  complicated	  role	  that	  purportedly	  “objective”	  science	  plays	  in	  American	  government.	  	  	  	  The	  book	  deals	  with	  the	  role	  of	  fisheries	  science	  in	  the	  development	  of	  US	  policy	  for	  oceans,	  primarily	  in	  the	  Pacific,	  from	  the	  1930s,	  when	  Japanese	  vessels	  began	  competing	  for	  salmon	  in	  waters	  off	  Alaska,	  through	  the	  UN-­‐sponsored	  meeting	  at	  Rome	  in	  1955,	  when	  US	  representatives	  managed	  to	  establish	  maximum	  sustainable	  yield	  (MSY)	  –	  the	  idea	  that	  harvests	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  grow	  unchecked	  until	  scientific	  evidence	  proved	  that	  particular	  stocks	  were	  overfished	  –	  as	  the	  organizing	  principle	  for	  the	  management	  of	  high-­‐seas	  fisheries.	  	  Finley’s	  argument	  is	  that	  MSY	  became	  US	  government	  policy,	  not	  because	  it	  explained	  observed	  changes	  in	  the	  fisheries	  better	  than	  alternative	  theories	  but	  because	  it	  worked	  so	  well	  to	  justify	  US	  demands	  for	  access	  to	  high-­‐seas	  resources	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  	  “MSY,”	  as	  Finley	  put	  it,	  “is,	  and	  always	  has	  been,	  policy	  disguised	  as	  science”	  (10).	  Once	  enshrined	  in	  policy,	  embodied	  in	  institutions,	  and	  backed	  up	  by	  investment,	  MSY-­‐the-­‐policy	  underwrote	  the	  depletion	  of	  fisheries	  the	  world	  over;	  it	  does	  so	  to	  this	  day.	  	  MSY	  was	  not	  without	  competitors:	  other	  theories	  of	  population	  dynamics	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  from	  Great	  Britain	  and	  Japan	  as	  well	  as	  the	  US,	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  environmental	  factors,	  price	  dynamics,	  and	  especially	  fishing	  pressure	  more	  than	  the	  relatively	  simplistic	  MSY	  model.	  	  MSY	  won	  out,	  however,	  because	  it	  better	  suited	  US	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  and	  because	  it	  resonated	  with	  deeply-­‐seated	  American	  ideas	  about	  nature,	  about	  frontier	  development,	  and	  about	  entrepreneurial	  liberty.	  	  Finley	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  Wilbert	  M.	  Chapman,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7Christina	  Johnson,	  “The	  Problem	  is	  Maximum	  Sustainable	  Yield,”	  Sea	  Grant	  California	  (December	  21,	  2007),	  http://www.csgc.ucsd.edu/NEWWSRROOM/NEWSRELEASES/Carmel_Finley.html,	  	  last	  visited	  June	  17,	  2014.	  	  
A	  
H-­‐Environment	  Roundtable	  Reviews,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  2	  (2015)	   10	  
who	  started	  out	  as	  a	  fishery	  biologist	  but	  found	  his	  niche	  as	  a	  policy	  entrepreneur,	  first	  in	  government	  and	  later	  in	  private	  industry.	  	  Chapman’s	  boundless	  faith	  in	  the	  wealth	  of	  ocean	  fisheries,	  combined	  with	  his	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  complexities	  either	  of	  the	  dynamics	  or	  the	  economics	  of	  real	  fisheries,	  made	  him	  the	  ideal	  advocate	  for	  keeping	  the	  high	  seas	  open	  for	  American	  commercial	  and	  strategic	  ambitions.	  	  He	  led	  the	  US	  delegation	  to	  the	  1955	  Rome	  conference	  and	  ensured	  its	  outcome.	  	  Thereafter	  he	  left	  academia	  and	  government	  service	  to	  serve	  as	  advisor	  and	  lobbyist	  (although	  Finley	  does	  not	  use	  the	  term),	  first	  for	  the	  American	  Tuna	  Association,	  later	  for	  Van	  Camp	  Seafood,	  and	  ultimately	  for	  Ralston-­‐Purina.	  	  	  	  More	  careful	  scientists	  disagreed	  with	  Chapman	  but	  were	  unable	  to	  counter	  him	  successfully,	  not	  least	  because	  they	  lacked	  the	  political	  skills	  that	  enabled	  him	  to	  garner	  industry	  support	  and	  unheard-­‐of	  amounts	  of	  government	  money	  for	  research	  programs.8	  	  British	  scientists	  like	  Michael	  Graham,	  Raymond	  Beverton,	  and	  Sidney	  Holt	  thought	  that	  governments	  should	  permit	  fisheries	  to	  grow	  slowly,	  under	  observation,	  so	  that	  problems	  would	  become	  visible	  before	  a	  fishery	  became	  overcapitalized	  and	  thus	  more	  difficult	  to	  control.	  	  Graham	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  insist	  that	  “the	  ability	  of	  fishermen	  to	  make	  a	  living”	  was	  a	  significant	  parameter	  in	  fishery	  dynamics	  (85,	  145).	  These	  scientists	  approached	  fisheries	  as	  integrated	  systems,	  attending	  to	  environmental,	  economic,	  and	  social	  factors	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	  target	  species.	  	  Japanese	  scientists	  made	  important	  contributions	  to	  fishery	  science	  as	  well,	  before	  and	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  although	  US	  policymakers	  paid	  scant	  attention	  to	  them	  (76-­‐78).	  	  MSY	  was	  more	  powerful	  politically	  because	  it	  was	  abstract	  and	  did	  not	  require	  affirmation	  in	  the	  particular	  details	  of	  economics	  or	  biology.	  	  It	  implied	  a	  management	  strategy	  of	  allowing	  harvests	  to	  grow	  unimpeded	  until	  stocks	  showed	  unmistakable	  evidence	  of	  overfishing:	  it	  socialized	  the	  cost	  of	  scientific	  uncertainty	  and	  deferred	  the	  troublesome	  task	  of	  limiting	  effort	  to	  an	  undetermined	  future.	  	  Best	  of	  all,	  it	  gave	  US	  policymakers	  a	  scientific	  reason	  for	  insisting	  that	  Latin	  American	  countries	  open	  access	  to	  just-­‐developing	  fisheries	  for	  tuna	  in	  their	  waters,	  while	  allowing	  the	  US	  to	  deny	  Japanese	  fishers	  to	  Alaska	  salmon	  because	  those	  fisheries	  were	  already	  “developed”	  and,	  at	  least	  theoretically,	  under	  management.	  	  One	  of	  Finley’s	  key	  insights	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  she	  links	  MSY	  to	  the	  Progressive,	  utilitarian,	  development-­‐oriented	  notion	  of	  “conservation”	  as	  “wise	  use,”	  which	  allowed	  Chapman	  and	  his	  allies	  in	  the	  State	  Department	  to	  elide	  the	  troublesome	  contradiction	  between	  insisting	  that	  US	  fisheries	  be	  closed	  to	  foreigners	  (because	  they	  were	  already	  “developed”	  and	  thus	  theoretically	  under	  government	  management)	  but	  that	  third-­‐world	  fishing	  grounds	  (which	  were	  as-­‐yet	  not	  “fully	  developed”)	  be	  kept	  open	  to	  US	  boats	  (165).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8Most	  impressively,	  the	  California	  Cooperative	  Oceanic	  Fisheries	  Investigations.	  	  See	  Arthur	  F.	  McEvoy,	  The	  Fisherman’s	  Problem:	  Ecology	  and	  Law	  in	  the	  California	  Fishereis,	  1850-­‐1980	  (Cambridge	  1986),	  pp.	  193-­‐94.	  	  
H-­‐Environment	  Roundtable	  Reviews,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  2	  (2015)	   11	  
As	  a	  history	  of	  science,	  All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea	  makes	  its	  key	  contribution	  by	  showing	  how	  politics,	  ideology,	  and	  interest	  influenced	  the	  substantive	  development	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  in	  this	  one,	  arguably	  parochial	  but	  nonetheless	  allegorical	  area.	  	  Finley	  shows	  how	  MSY	  displaced	  its	  competitors,	  not	  because	  it	  yielded	  any	  insight	  into	  the	  problems	  at	  hand	  but	  because	  it	  enabled	  its	  exponents	  to	  overcome	  their	  opposition	  rhetorically	  –	  not	  least	  because	  it	  finessed	  key	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  Americans’	  position	  and	  because	  it	  resonated	  deeply	  with	  postwar	  Americans’	  view	  of	  themselves	  and	  their	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  	  The	  analysis	  is	  structural	  more	  than	  internal;	  more	  Foucault	  than	  Kuhn.	  	  Elizabeth	  Warren	  has	  written	  cogently	  on	  the	  subtle	  and	  not-­‐so-­‐subtle	  ways	  in	  which	  power	  and	  money	  influence	  the	  course	  of	  scientific	  inquiry,	  not	  only	  in	  highly-­‐charged	  areas	  like	  pharmacology	  but	  in	  the	  more	  obscure	  corners	  of	  social	  science	  as	  well.9	  	  Finley	  insists	  that	  Chapman	  was	  sincere	  in	  his	  convictions	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  oceans	  to	  produce	  food	  and	  of	  markets	  to	  correct	  themselves;	  her	  critiques	  of	  the	  science	  behind	  MSY	  and	  the	  uncritical	  way	  in	  which	  its	  exponents	  advanced	  it	  as	  a	  template	  for	  policymaking	  are	  trenchant	  nonetheless.	  	  	  	  	  The	  remarkable	  thing	  about	  MSY	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  crowded	  out	  its	  competitors	  and	  continues	  to	  this	  day	  to	  cloud	  both	  science	  and	  policymaking,	  like	  some	  oceanographic	  version	  of	  the	  Laffer	  curve.	  	  Biologists	  continue	  to	  disagree	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  overfishing	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  exploited	  species;	  Finley	  notes	  that	  the	  question	  –	  which	  one	  would	  think	  was	  long	  since	  put	  to	  rest	  –	  generated	  heated	  controversy	  as	  recently	  as	  2009	  (165).10	  	  As	  before,	  researchers’	  positions	  on	  the	  issue	  tend	  to	  correlate	  with	  their	  nationalities	  and	  institutional	  affiliations:	  Canadian	  scientists	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  harvesting	  in	  fishery	  declines,	  for	  examples,	  while	  US	  researchers	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  point	  to	  the	  role	  of	  “environmental”	  influences	  on	  fishery	  dynamics.11	  	  Fisheries	  themselves	  continue	  to	  decline,	  meanwhile,	  seemingly	  inexorably.	  	  All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea	  casts	  a	  clear	  light	  on	  the	  ways	  that	  rent-­‐seeking,	  by	  scientists	  and	  politicians	  as	  much	  as	  by	  the	  fishing	  industry	  itself,	  contributes	  to	  the	  process.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9Elizabeth	  Warren,	  “The	  Market	  for	  Data:	  The	  Changing	  Role	  of	  Social	  Sciences	  in	  Shaping	  the	  Law,”	  Wisconsin	  Law	  Review	  v.	  2002,	  pp.	  1-­‐43	  (2002).	  10See	  Boris	  Worm	  et	  al.,	  “Rebuilding	  Global	  Fisheries,”	  Science,	  325	  (2009):	  578.	  11See	  Arthur	  F.	  McEvoy,	  "The	  Role	  of	  Law	  in	  Engineering	  'Natural'	  Disasters,"	  Onati	  Socio-­‐
legal	  Series	  (online),	  3(2):	  293-­‐311	  (2013).	  	  Available	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221241.	  	  	  Reprinted	  in	  Disasters	  and	  Socio-­‐Legal	  Studies,	  ed.	  Susan	  Sterett	  (Quid	  Pro	  Books,	  2013),	  155-­‐76.	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Comments	  by	  Bo	  Poulsen,	  Aalborg	  University	  
	   	  ver	  the	  course	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  more	  or	  less	  all	  modern	  states	  with	  access	  to	  a	  coastline	  have	  sought	  to	  harvest	  the	  fruits	  of	  the	  sea.	  Worldwide	  fishing	  has	  intensified	  manifold.	  More	  countries	  than	  ever	  before	  take	  part	  in	  fishing,	  more	  and	  more	  species	  are	  targeted,	  the	  finished	  food	  products	  travel	  further	  and	  further	  from	  when	  they	  are	  caught	  until	  they	  end	  up	  on	  a	  dinner	  table,	  adding	  to	  the	  ecological	  footprint	  of	  world	  fishing.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  successful	  attempts	  at	  restoring	  depleted	  fish	  stocks	  and	  endangered	  marine	  species	  are	  but	  a	  few.	  Within	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  decades	  multiple	  scientific	  papers	  have	  dealt	  with	  historicizing	  these	  phenomena	  of	  exploitation,	  and	  frequent	  depletions,	  of	  the	  living	  marine	  resources	  of	  the	  world’s	  oceans.	  This	  seems	  well	  documented	  as	  an	  almost	  integral	  part	  of	  modern	  industrial	  fishing.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  reasons	  for	  why	  this	  has	  happened	  are	  far	  from	  fully	  understood,	  and	  All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea	  adds	  considerably	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  confluence	  of	  historical	  developments,	  which	  together	  makes	  up	  a	  totality	  of	  the	  world	  history	  of	  20th	  century	  fisheries.	  	  Finley	  is	  not	  marketing	  her	  book	  as	  a	  ‘brief	  world	  history	  of	  20th	  century	  fisheries’,	  and	  rightfully	  so,	  but	  what	  she	  does	  cover	  on	  a	  mere	  couple	  of	  hundred	  pages	  is	  quite	  a	  lot	  more	  than	  what	  is	  promised	  in	  the	  somewhat	  ‘techy’	  full	  title	  of	  the	  book	  which	  reads:	  All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea:	  Maximum	  Sustainable	  Yield	  and	  the	  Failure	  of	  
Fisheries	  Management.	  
	  
Maximum	  Sustainable	  Yield	  (MSY)	  conceptualizes	  the	  idea	  that	  natural	  resources,	  stocks	  of	  Pacific	  salmon	  for	  instance,	  produce	  a	  surplus	  of	  adult	  fish,	  which	  can	  be	  fished	  without	  harming	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  stock	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  argument	  even	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  to	  state	  that	  it	  is	  beneficial	  for	  the	  fish	  stock	  to	  be	  fished,	  so	  as	  to	  remove	  the	  older	  slow-­‐growing	  fish	  from	  the	  stock	  to	  give	  room	  for	  younger	  faster-­‐growing	  fish.	  	  Fishing	  then	  can	  be	  sustained	  at	  fairly	  high	  level	  of	  intensity	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  fishermen	  and	  the	  marine	  environment	  alike.	  This	  prospect	  was	  so	  appealing	  to	  the	  modern	  fisheries	  nations	  that	  it	  became	  central	  to	  international	  negotiations	  on	  how	  to	  share	  the	  fruits	  of	  the	  sea	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  Atlantic	  and	  Pacific	  Oceans.	  	  The	  tricky	  part	  of	  MSY	  is	  to	  measure	  where	  exactly	  to	  place	  the	  line	  of	  maximum	  fishing	  intensity	  without	  jeopardizing	  the	  targeted	  fish	  stock.	  This	  is	  where,	  since	  the	  1940s,	  marine	  science	  has	  been	  enlisted	  to	  come	  up	  with	  viable	  solutions	  using	  ever	  more	  sophisticated	  mathematical	  models	  inferred	  onto	  ever	  larger	  collections	  of	  fisheries	  statistics	  derived	  from	  scientific	  surveys	  and	  commercial	  catch	  data.	  However,	  while	  ideally	  the	  models	  can	  predict	  the	  future	  scenarios	  with	  great	  precision,	  in	  reality	  most	  marine	  ecosystems	  are	  so	  complex	  that	  inter-­‐annual	  stock	  size	  fluctuations	  are	  contingent	  upon	  an	  almost	  infinite	  range	  of	  dynamic	  factors.	  The	  scientific	  challenges	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  MSY	  are	  well-­‐known,	  and	  described	  in	  the	  literature.	  Yet	  Finley’s	  All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea	  is	  a	  ‘first’	  in	  the	  
O	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sense	  that	  we	  are	  treated	  to	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  how	  MSY	  came	  to	  dominate	  international	  fisheries	  management	  from	  the	  1950s	  until	  well	  into	  the	  1990s.	  As	  such,	  All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea	  is	  a	  great	  book.	  The	  arguments	  presented	  are	  brought	  forward	  largely	  by	  virtue	  of	  highlighting	  a	  number	  of	  stories	  centering	  on	  important	  people,	  processes	  and	  events	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  cover	  everything.	  This	  might	  create	  a	  bias,	  but	  is	  works	  very	  well	  as	  a	  narrative.	  	  For	  someone	  coming	  from	  Europe,	  like	  me,	  Finley’s	  opening	  focus	  on	  the	  fishing	  industry	  of	  the	  American	  Pacific	  Northwest	  is	  refreshing,	  and	  I	  now	  know	  much	  more	  about	  the	  ongoing	  antagonism	  between	  Japanese	  and	  American	  fishing	  interests	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  than	  I	  did	  before	  reading	  the	  book.	  However,	  one	  downside	  of	  not	  having	  intimate	  knowledge	  of	  Pacific	  topography	  is	  that	  I	  missed	  one	  or	  two	  maps	  of	  the	  Pacific	  indicating	  the	  changing	  territorial	  expanses	  of	  American,	  Japanese,	  Peruvian	  and	  Chilean	  etc.	  fishing	  activities	  following	  the	  1945	  Truman	  Declaration	  and	  into	  the	  1950s,	  as	  Japan	  retained	  their	  pre-­‐war	  sphere	  of	  influence	  with	  regards	  natural	  marine	  resource	  exploitation.	  One	  potential	  bias	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  main	  focus	  is	  on	  American	  Pacific	  fisheries	  policy,	  where	  the	  motor	  of	  the	  narrative	  is	  the	  doings	  of	  American	  fisheries	  lobbyist,	  Wilbert	  Chapman,	  in	  combinations	  with	  high	  politics,	  the	  American	  lead	  initiatives	  in	  terms	  of	  territorial	  doctrines	  and	  regulations	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  WWII.	  However,	  these	  choices	  are	  fully	  justifiable	  given	  the	  fact	  the	  United	  States	  was	  the	  paramount	  victor	  and	  the	  dominant	  military	  and	  economic	  power	  in	  the	  Pacific	  region	  after	  1945.	  Indeed	  it	  becomes	  explicit	  in	  the	  book	  that	  state	  power	  has	  been	  and	  still	  is	  of	  paramount	  importance	  for	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  fisheries.	  	  Finley	  makes	  clear	  how	  the	  Truman	  declaration	  set	  the	  boundaries	  for	  the	  postwar	  buildup	  of	  the	  Japanese	  fishing	  fleet.	  Then,	  following	  the	  fall	  of	  Kuomintang	  China	  and	  new	  geopolitical	  situation	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  it	  is	  equally	  convincing	  that	  the	  Japanese	  government	  realized	  their	  rising	  strategic	  importance	  as	  an	  American	  ally	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Upholding	  American	  fishing	  interests	  in	  the	  Pacific	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  mainly	  Japanese	  fisheries	  interests	  then	  became	  subordinate	  to	  the	  overall	  containment	  strategy	  towards	  communist	  regimes	  in	  Asia.	  	  According	  to	  Finley,	  part	  of	  the	  US-­‐Japanese	  negotiations	  post-­‐WWII	  was	  geared	  at	  denouncing	  Japanese	  marine	  science,	  which	  had	  been	  very	  prolific	  in	  the	  1930s,	  and	  Finley	  even	  calls	  it	  a	  racist	  approach	  to	  Japanese	  science.	  This	  is	  a	  serious	  allegation,	  and	  a	  highly	  intriguing	  proposition.	  Intuitively,	  it	  seems	  very	  likely,	  but	  I	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  see	  the	  evidence	  for	  this	  scientific	  racism	  fleshed	  out	  a	  bit	  more	  in	  the	  text.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  very	  interesting	  to	  see	  to	  what	  extent	  such	  shaming	  of	  science	  was	  a	  part	  of	  American	  fisheries	  policies	  towards	  European	  marine	  science,	  and	  indeed	  if	  other	  leading	  fishing	  nations	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Japan	  or	  Norway	  upheld	  a	  similarly	  chauvinist	  agenda	  towards	  the	  marine	  science	  from	  competing	  nations.	  My	  inclination	  would	  be	  to	  suggest	  that	  marine	  science	  would	  be	  instrumental	  in	  such	  ways	  regardless	  of	  which	  country	  was	  the	  orchestrator	  thereof,	  but	  to	  my	  recollection	  this	  question	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  researched	  in	  a	  systematic	  and	  comparative	  way.	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While	  the	  US	  experience	  shows	  that	  fisheries	  rights	  came	  to	  follow	  from	  state	  power	  and	  dedication	  to	  support	  a	  fisheries	  sector,	  the	  spectacular	  whaling	  story	  of	  Greek	  shipping	  tycoon	  Aristotle	  Onassis	  reveals	  the	  risks	  of	  not	  of	  being	  backed	  by	  a	  powerful	  nearby	  state,	  when	  embarking	  on	  a	  high	  seas	  whaling	  expedition.	  Onassis	  came	  in	  deep	  trouble	  as	  he	  sent	  three	  Panama	  registered	  ships	  accompanied	  with	  dozens	  of	  catcher	  boats	  to	  Pacific	  Latin	  America	  in	  1954.	  Operating	  inside	  Peruvian	  territorial	  waters,	  Onassis’s	  three	  whaling	  vessels	  were	  captured	  and	  taken	  by	  the	  Peruvian	  navy,	  of	  which	  one	  of	  them	  was	  taken	  only	  after	  a	  high	  seas	  pursuit,	  where	  a	  Peruvian	  airplane	  fired	  into	  the	  water	  around	  it.	  As	  Onassis’s	  fleet	  was	  insured	  by	  Lloyd’s	  in	  London,	  they	  had	  to	  pay	  a	  fine	  of	  $3	  million	  for	  the	  ships’	  release.	  Onassis’s	  case	  serves	  to	  show	  clearly	  how	  huge	  capital	  investments	  did	  not	  suffice	  for	  successful	  whaling	  in	  the	  1950s.	  When	  the	  newly	  established	  territorial	  waters	  were	  violated	  the	  backing	  by	  a	  powerful	  state	  was	  necessary.	  Onassis	  had	  none	  of	  that	  in	  the	  Pacific	  and	  was	  treated	  as	  any	  other	  pirate.	  	  Finley	  has	  done	  a	  great	  job	  in	  terms	  of	  portraying	  the	  central	  actors	  in	  her	  story	  in	  a	  fair	  and	  nuanced	  way.	  The	  American	  lobbyist	  Wilbert	  Chapman	  for	  instance	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  playing	  the	  lead	  role	  throughout	  the	  book.	  Chapman	  represented	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  American	  fishing	  industry,	  chiefly	  the	  immensely	  capitalized	  Pacific	  salmon	  and	  tuna	  fisheries.	  Given	  that	  this	  industry	  was	  responsible	  for	  significant	  depletion	  of	  Pacific	  fish	  stocks	  in	  the	  middle	  decades	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  Chapman	  might	  have	  been	  cast	  as	  a	  prince	  of	  darkness	  in	  light	  of	  contemporary	  views	  on	  conservation.	  Yet	  Finley	  remains	  loyal	  to	  his	  cause	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  she	  is	  keenly	  alert	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  his	  own	  time,	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s,	  Chapman	  along	  with	  most	  fisheries	  scientists	  and	  fishermen	  had	  really	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  tuna	  and	  salmon	  of	  such	  a	  vast	  ocean	  as	  the	  Pacific	  could	  be	  seriously	  depleted,	  when	  this	  was	  not	  in	  the	  self-­‐interest	  of	  any	  one	  country	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  fisheries.	  Therefore,	  Chapman	  is	  portrayed	  with	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  sympathy,	  even	  if	  he	  is	  a	  somewhat	  doubtful	  protagonist.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  colourful	  British	  marine	  scientist	  Michael	  Graham	  is	  portrayed	  as	  an	  almost	  tragic	  hero	  in	  the	  story.	  Graham	  is	  famous	  for	  his	  ‘great	  law	  of	  fishing’,	  stipulating	  that	  unrestricted	  fishing	  becomes	  unprofitable	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  While	  at	  least	  on	  paper,	  MSY	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  curb	  such	  development,	  in	  reality	  the	  MSY	  style	  of	  regulation	  tended	  to	  overexploit	  the	  targeted	  resource	  almost	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  no	  restrictions.	  Finley	  brings	  forward	  extremely	  interesting	  information	  on	  how	  important	  critical	  papers	  on	  the	  limits	  of	  MSY	  were	  simply	  edited	  out	  of	  the	  final	  report	  from	  the	  1955	  conference	  in	  Rome.	  	  Admirable	  as	  the	  book	  is,	  I	  am	  nonetheless	  a	  bit	  puzzled	  as	  to	  what	  were	  the	  main	  driving	  forces	  when	  trying	  to	  assert	  why	  MSY	  came	  to	  dominate	  fisheries	  management	  as	  it	  did.	  My	  hunch	  is	  that	  Finley	  would	  agree	  that	  the	  contingency	  of	  global	  geopolitics	  and	  ensuing	  considerations	  on	  the	  security	  of	  marine	  food	  sources	  before,	  during	  and	  after	  WWII	  is	  the	  most	  important	  indirect	  stimulus	  to	  Pacific	  and	  North	  Atlantic	  fisheries.	  But	  what	  was	  then	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  colorful	  individuals,	  Wilbert	  Chapman,	  Michael	  Graham,	  Nick	  Bez,	  Schaefer	  etc.?	  Were	  they	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merely	  representing	  the	  views	  of	  different	  scientific,	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  interest	  groups,	  or	  did	  they	  themselves	  mold	  the	  future	  of	  fisheries	  by	  way	  of	  their	  actions	  in	  the	  1930s-­‐50s?	  In	  other	  words,	  would	  different	  scientists	  providing	  different	  scientific	  input	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  different	  outcome?	  	  Implicit	  from	  the	  story	  told	  in	  All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea,	  I	  am	  inclined	  to	  think	  not.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  it	  follows	  that	  MSY	  was	  conceived	  as	  a	  useful	  political	  instrument.	  The	  concept	  gained	  a	  foothold	  on	  government	  policy	  in	  the	  US	  and	  abroad	  long	  before	  there	  was	  any	  scientific	  evidence	  that	  this	  was	  the	  right	  model	  to	  impose	  on	  international	  fisheries	  management.	  Only	  afterwards	  were	  marine	  scientists	  enlisted	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  science	  to	  support	  this	  already	  agreed	  upon	  model.	  Scientists,	  it	  follows,	  were	  dispensable,	  geopolitical	  interests	  not.	  This	  leaves	  us	  with	  a	  very	  important	  message	  on	  the	  role	  of	  science	  in	  society,	  and	  one	  of	  relevance	  far	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  marine	  science	  history.	  
	  
All	  the	  Fish	  in	  the	  Sea	  raises	  a	  further	  number	  of	  questions,	  which	  should	  attract	  the	  interest	  of	  future	  research	  into	  the	  topic	  of	  how	  modern	  global	  fisheries	  and	  fisheries	  management	  came	  about	  during	  the	  20th	  century.	  Finley	  shows	  a	  discrepancy	  in	  the	  wishes	  for	  international	  fisheries	  management	  between	  the	  different	  countries	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  Rome	  conference.	  A	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  strategy	  and	  scientific	  backing	  in	  countries	  other	  than	  USA	  and	  the	  UK	  would	  be	  very	  interesting.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  interesting	  to	  investigate	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  cooperation	  within	  an	  organization	  like	  the	  International	  Council	  for	  the	  Exploration	  of	  the	  Sea	  played	  a	  role	  for	  the	  position	  of	  different	  countries.	  A	  comparative	  approach	  I	  believe	  would	  further	  qualify	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  overall	  development	  of	  fisheries	  management	  has	  been	  contingent	  on	  the	  doings	  of	  a	  select	  number	  of	  American	  and	  English	  scientists	  and	  civil	  servants,	  compared	  to	  the	  more	  structural	  economic,	  political	  and	  technological	  changes	  in	  the	  history	  of	  marine	  resource	  exploitation.	  	  Finley	  has	  written	  a	  relatively	  short	  monograph,	  but	  it	  is	  rich	  in	  scope	  and	  range	  topically	  and	  geographically.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  very	  good	  read,	  and	  Finley	  has	  done	  a	  great	  job	  in	  weeding	  out	  scientific	  jargon	  and	  too	  many	  technical	  phrases,	  which	  can	  otherwise	  make	  history	  of	  science	  scholarship	  a	  tough	  read.	  This	  book	  could	  be	  read	  by	  a	  Danish	  undergraduate	  history	  student,	  and	  I	  will	  seriously	  consider	  using	  at	  least	  parts	  of	  it	  in	  university	  teaching.	  I	  think	  that	  is	  the	  best	  recommendation	  I	  can	  give	  to	  this	  type	  of	  scholarly	  literature.	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Comments	  by	  Michael	  J.	  Chiarappa,	  Quinnipiac	  University	  	  s	  a	  marine	  environmental	  historian,	  the	  concept	  of	  maximum	  sustainable	  yield	  (MSY)	  is	  a	  conspicuous	  concern	  in	  my	  research	  and	  teaching.	  From	  another	  perspective,	  in	  my	  role	  as	  a	  public	  historian—where	  I	  have	  attempted	  to	  foster	  dialogue	  and	  programming	  with	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  groups,	  museums,	  and	  fishing	  communities—MSY’s	  historical	  shadow	  is	  ever-­‐present,	  giving	  fisheries	  a	  usable	  past	  whose	  immediacy	  can	  be	  palpable	  and	  frequently	  contentious.	  Why,	  one	  might	  ask,	  does	  MSY	  become	  so	  vexing	  when,	  in	  our	  modern	  Green	  age,	  just	  the	  mention	  of	  “sustainable”	  or	  “sustainability”	  often	  evokes	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  stewardship	  among	  those	  with	  even	  the	  vaguest	  awareness	  of	  American	  fisheries?	  Clarity	  emerges	  when	  we	  begin	  to	  consider	  the	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  affected	  by	  MSY—both	  in	  the	  past	  and	  present—and	  the	  political	  machinations	  that	  inevitably	  grip	  competing	  claims	  to	  marine	  resources.	  So	  it	  might	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  some,	  but	  certainly	  not	  to	  many	  in	  fisheries,	  government	  and	  academic	  circles,	  that	  MSY’s	  conceptual	  birth	  and	  subsequent	  implementation	  is	  so	  complexly	  grounded	  in	  ideology,	  not	  necessarily	  sound	  science	  to	  protect	  global	  fish	  stocks.	  	  Carmel	  Finley,	  in	  her	  book,	  All	  The	  Fish	  In	  The	  Sea:	  Maximum	  Sustainable	  Yield	  and	  
the	  Failure	  of	  Fisheries	  Management,	  unravels	  this	  politically	  intriguing,	  yet	  environmentally	  tragic,	  legacy.	  To	  illuminate	  the	  tradition	  out	  of	  which	  MSY	  emerged,	  Finley	  introduces	  her	  readership	  to	  an	  often	  widely	  misunderstood	  fact—fisheries	  science	  developed	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  increase	  harvests	  and	  expand	  economic	  opportunity,	  not	  necessarily	  protect	  fish.	  Not	  unlike	  the	  Lockean	  impulse	  that	  pushed	  colonists	  to	  gainfully	  appropriate	  the	  earth’s	  bounty,	  late	  nineteenth/early	  twentieth	  century	  fisheries	  science	  was	  about	  refining	  the	  efficient,	  “wise-­‐use”	  of	  the	  ocean’s	  surplus;	  in	  short,	  the	  essence	  of	  “conservation”	  as	  the	  guiding	  rubric	  for	  the	  exploitation	  of	  the	  seas.	  This	  agenda	  proceeded	  with	  faith	  in	  the	  sea’s	  biological	  resiliency	  (in	  spite	  of	  signs	  of	  declining	  stocks),	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  scientific	  management	  and	  artificial	  propagation	  could	  help	  restore	  stocks.	  The	  U.S.	  Fish	  Commission,	  and	  later,	  its	  successor,	  the	  U.S.	  Bureau	  of	  Fisheries,	  facilitated	  these	  ambitions	  through	  the	  development	  of	  hatcheries,	  and	  encouraged	  the	  design	  of	  technology	  that	  would	  allow	  fishermen	  to	  venture	  to	  ever	  more	  distant	  waters.	  The	  ideological	  footprints	  of	  Alexander	  Hamilton	  and	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  were	  everywhere	  during	  this	  time	  of	  intoxicating	  commercial	  expectations,	  making	  fisheries	  an	  instrument	  of	  American	  territorial	  reach,	  economic	  hegemony,	  and	  a	  deeply	  engrained	  national	  ethos	  committed	  to	  improving	  nature.	  Similar	  to	  insights	  offered	  in	  Charles	  Rosenberg’s	  work,	  Finley	  delineates	  the	  consistent	  pattern	  of	  cultural	  and	  political	  prerogatives	  that	  shaped	  and	  drove	  applied	  scientific	  research,	  and	  how	  they	  empowered	  the	  conduct	  of	  America’s	  modern	  commercial	  fisheries.12	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Charles	  E.	  Rosenberg,	  No	  Other	  Gods:	  On	  Science	  and	  American	  Social	  Thought	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1997).	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  The	  most	  immediate	  antecedents	  behind	  MSY,	  and	  the	  events	  that	  gradually	  catapulted	  it	  to	  the	  forefront	  of	  American	  fisheries	  policy,	  were	  rooted	  in	  the	  country’s	  quest	  to	  insure	  its	  economic	  and	  diplomatic	  options	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Basin	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Today,	  we	  are	  largely	  aware	  of	  how	  environmental	  politics	  can	  be	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  America’s	  national	  security	  and	  wider	  geopolitical	  affairs.	  Finley’s	  treatment	  of	  American	  efforts	  to	  blunt	  the	  formidable	  might	  of	  Japan’s	  commercial	  fisheries	  in	  the	  years	  leading	  up	  to	  World	  War	  II	  shows	  that	  these	  concerns	  are	  longstanding.	  It	  also	  reveals—as	  many	  maritime	  historians	  know—that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  envisioning	  the	  Pacific	  Basin	  as	  critical	  in	  realizing	  the	  fruits	  of	  Manifest	  Destiny.	  The	  urgency	  behind	  these	  motives	  had	  been	  growing	  steadily	  since	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  and	  with	  Japan’s	  emergence	  as	  the	  world’s	  leading	  fishing	  power,	  coupled	  with	  its	  increasingly	  aggressive	  territorial	  expansion,	  the	  United	  States	  faced	  a	  more	  complicated	  task	  in	  staking	  its	  claim	  to	  the	  “Pacific	  Fisheries	  Frontier”	  (Chapter	  3).	  Finley	  uses	  the	  late	  1930s	  standoff	  over	  access	  to	  Bristol	  Bay’s	  salmon	  to	  highlight	  how	  the	  United	  States	  used	  “conservation,”	  as	  well	  as	  a	  strong	  dose	  of	  ethnocentrism,	  to	  limit	  Japanese	  fishing	  in	  the	  waters	  near	  Alaska.	  Americans	  hedged	  their	  position	  in	  these	  early	  rounds	  of	  the	  salmon	  wars	  by	  inaccurately	  claiming	  a	  superior	  conservation	  program	  and	  disparaging	  Japanese	  science.	  The	  prejudicial	  overtones	  that	  accompanied	  accusations	  of	  the	  Japanese	  as	  irresponsible	  stewards	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  in	  America’s	  conservation	  rhetoric—Chinese	  and	  Japanese	  immigrants	  faced	  it	  in	  California,	  Irish	  and	  Italians	  faced	  it	  in	  varying	  degrees	  in	  New	  England,	  and	  most	  recently,	  Vietnamese	  and	  Native	  Americans	  have	  faced	  it	  in	  various	  areas	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  a	  fusion	  of	  science	  and	  policy	  (even	  if	  empirical	  rigor	  and	  efficacy	  were	  lacking	  in	  both)	  that	  could	  flexibly	  empower	  the	  ideological	  and	  economic	  underpinnings	  of	  its	  global	  fishing	  crusade.	  MSY	  fit	  the	  bill.	  In	  the	  hands	  of	  its	  chief	  proponent,	  Wilbert	  McLeod	  Chapman,	  it	  was,	  in	  Finley’s	  words,	  Western	  science”	  functioning	  as	  “a	  proxy	  for	  Western	  democracy”	  (78).	  This	  sentiment	  imbued	  MSY	  with	  significant	  latitude	  and,	  emboldened	  by	  Western	  science’s	  presumed	  superiority,	  justified	  assertions	  by	  its	  proponents	  that	  fishing	  need	  not	  be	  restricted	  until	  there	  was	  scientific	  proof	  that	  stocks	  were	  being	  overfished.	  Such	  a	  formulation	  of	  MSY	  allowed	  the	  United	  States	  to	  use	  it	  to	  arbit	  an	  array	  of	  objectives.	  Central	  among	  these	  was	  freedom	  of	  the	  seas,	  necessary	  to	  insure	  the	  options	  of	  America’s	  distant	  water	  fleet.	  It	  was	  also	  a	  means	  to	  encourage	  the	  liberating	  specter	  of	  American	  free	  market	  fishing	  among	  our	  allies,	  and,	  in	  more	  politically	  volatile	  areas	  of	  the	  globe,	  blunt	  the	  influence	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  movements.	  With	  purportedly	  sound	  science	  on	  its	  side,	  MSY	  allowed	  the	  United	  States	  to	  both	  encourage	  and	  leverage	  the	  postwar	  expansion	  of	  Japanese	  fisheries,	  and	  refute	  claims	  from	  Latin	  American	  countries	  that	  American	  tuna	  fleets	  were	  endangering	  their	  offshore	  resources.	  Finley	  challenges	  us	  to	  see	  a	  complex	  matrix	  at	  work—the	  re-­‐packaging	  of	  the	  political,	  moral,	  and	  scientific	  weight	  of	  America’s	  conservation	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tradition	  into	  a	  policy	  of	  MSY.	  This	  re-­‐packaging	  was	  necessary	  if	  Chapman	  and	  his	  cohort	  were	  going	  to	  profitably	  internationalize	  American	  fisheries	  and	  advance	  the	  geopolitical	  clout	  they	  stood	  to	  exert	  in	  diplomatic	  affairs.	  	  By	  the	  1950s,	  the	  sea’s	  bounty—particularly	  Pacific	  tuna—was	  becoming	  so	  valuable	  in	  the	  modern	  global	  marketplace	  that	  the	  urge	  by	  nations	  to	  enclose	  their	  waters—to	  insure	  their	  wealth	  at	  home—was	  reaching	  greater	  heights.	  Just	  as	  American	  states	  had	  jousted	  for	  territorial	  control	  of	  the	  marine	  resources	  in	  their	  waters	  and	  solidified	  these	  claims	  in	  the	  public	  trust	  doctrine,	  so	  too	  did	  capital-­‐intensive	  fisheries	  prompt	  nations	  to	  extend	  their	  offshore	  jurisdiction.13	  This	  issue,	  along	  with	  concern	  over	  how	  the	  world’s	  fish	  stocks	  might	  best	  be	  conserved,	  was	  the	  focus	  of	  a	  conference	  held	  in	  Rome	  in	  1955	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  (FAO).	  Capitalizing	  on	  Milner	  B.	  Schaefer’s	  surplus	  production	  theory,	  along	  with	  heavy	  lobbying	  from	  William	  Herrington	  and	  Wilbert	  Chapman,	  and	  a	  strong	  dose	  of	  American	  conservation	  boosterism,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  able	  to	  get	  conference	  delegates	  from	  the	  world’s	  leading	  distant	  water	  fishing	  nations	  to	  sanction	  MSY	  “as	  the	  scientific	  goal	  of	  international	  fisheries	  management”(148).	  While	  the	  luminaries	  of	  American	  fisheries	  management	  may	  have	  earnestly	  believed	  in	  its	  efficacy,	  there	  is	  no	  denying	  that	  MSY	  provided	  critical	  diplomatic	  cover	  for	  the	  United	  States	  as	  it	  sought	  common	  ground	  with	  other	  nations	  hoping	  to	  push	  the	  limits	  of	  fish	  harvests.	  Not	  that	  there	  were	  not	  dissenting	  voices.	  British	  scientist	  Michael	  Graham	  urged	  caution,	  advocating	  catch	  restrictions	  before	  stocks	  showed	  signs	  of	  stress,	  as	  well	  as	  greater	  attention	  to	  interactions	  among	  fish	  populations.	  Similarly,	  Graham’s	  Japanese	  colleague,	  Tomonari	  Matsushita,	  argued	  that	  MSY	  assumed	  optimum	  biological	  conditions	  that	  were	  impossible	  to	  predict	  given	  the	  ecological	  variables	  that	  were	  in	  play	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  In	  retrospect,	  we	  are	  struck,	  but	  perhaps	  not	  surprised,	  at	  these	  voices	  being	  muffled.	  But	  MSY,	  as	  a	  scientific	  paradigm,	  conveniently	  conformed	  to	  the	  juggernaut	  that	  was	  being	  unleashed	  by	  high-­‐volume,	  capital-­‐driven	  fisheries,	  an	  approach	  laden	  with	  virtuous	  economic	  assumptions	  that	  downplayed	  the	  environmental	  costs	  of	  such	  aggressive	  expansion.	  	  When	  reading	  All	  The	  Fish	  In	  The	  Sea,	  we	  are	  not	  so	  much	  surprised	  at	  the	  human	  circumstances	  that	  shape	  the	  focus	  and	  application	  of	  scientific	  inquiry,	  but	  are	  reminded	  that	  these	  motives	  are	  so	  deeply	  wrought	  (historically	  and	  culturally).	  Of	  course,	  all	  of	  this	  complicates	  environmental	  decision-­‐making	  and	  natural	  resource	  use,	  as	  we	  well	  know	  from	  Dean	  Bavington’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  “managed	  annihilation”	  of	  the	  northwest	  Atlantic’s	  cod	  stocks.14	  MSY’s	  intellectual	  pedigree	  arguably	  spans	  centuries,	  extending	  from	  John	  Locke	  to	  the	  culture	  of	  improvement	  to	  the	  modern	  belief	  that	  science	  can	  remedy	  any	  of	  society’s	  ills.	  When	  all	  this	  is	  wrapped	  in	  an	  ethos	  committed	  to	  empowering	  American	  democracy	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Bonnie	  J.	  McCay,	  Oyster	  Wars	  and	  the	  Public	  Trust:	  Property,	  Law,	  and	  Ecology	  in	  New	  
Jersey	  History	  (Tucson:	  University	  of	  Arizona	  Press,	  1998).	  14	  Dean	  Bavington,	  Managed	  Annihilation:	  An	  Unnatural	  History	  of	  the	  Newfoundland	  Cod	  
Collapse	  (Vancouver,	  BC:	  University	  of	  British	  Columbia	  Press	  Press,	  2010).	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wealth,	  we	  are	  able,	  as	  Finley	  aptly	  shows,	  to	  better	  understand	  science	  in	  its	  guise	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  compromise.	  Matthew	  McKenzie	  has	  explained	  how	  these	  integrated	  forces	  produced	  the	  profile	  of	  the	  “iconic	  fisherman,”	  an	  image	  whose	  cultural	  tether	  was	  so	  formidable	  it	  was	  able	  to	  exact	  favorable	  conservation	  concessions	  when	  American	  fisheries	  began	  confronting	  some	  of	  their	  most	  pressing	  challenges.15	  This	  image	  still	  exerts	  a	  grip	  on	  America’s	  environmental	  imagination,	  and	  continues	  to	  shadow	  deliberations	  surrounding	  American	  fisheries	  management.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  this	  mythic	  shroud	  had	  an	  indelible	  effect	  on	  Chapman	  and	  his	  fellow	  proponents	  of	  MSY,	  and	  impaired	  wider	  considerations	  of	  how	  fisheries	  science	  and	  policy	  could	  ever	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  marine	  ecosystems.	  For	  all	  the	  reasons	  Finley	  puts	  forward,	  along	  with	  those	  recently	  voiced	  by	  Jeffrey	  Bolster,	  we	  can	  hardly	  afford	  to	  not	  examine	  the	  historic	  contexts	  that	  endow	  “sustainability”	  with	  its	  virtue—certainly	  a	  strong	  case	  for	  making	  marine	  environmental	  history	  a	  more	  vital	  force	  in	  fisheries	  management.16	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Matthew	  McKenzie,	  “Iconic	  Fishermen	  and	  the	  Fates	  of	  New	  England	  Fisheries	  Regulations,	  1883-­‐1912,”	  Environmental	  History	  17	  (January	  2012):	  3-­‐28.	  16	  W.	  Jeffrey	  Bolster,	  The	  Mortal	  Sea:	  Fishing	  the	  Atlantic	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Sail	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2012).	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Response	  by	  Carmel	  Finley,	  Oregon	  State	  University	  	  hanks	  to	  Jake	  Hamblin	  for	  organizing	  this	  roundtable	  on	  my	  book	  and	  for	  finding	  four	  such	  careful	  and	  thoughtful	  scholars.	  All	  of	  you	  have	  given	  me	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pleasant	  days	  of	  my	  academic	  life,	  as	  I	  read	  and	  re-­‐read	  your	  comments.	  I	  am	  exceedingly	  grateful	  to	  have	  my	  work	  read	  through	  different	  historical	  filters,	  and	  for	  questions	  that	  stretch	  my	  own	  conception	  of	  my	  work.	  	  	  I	  very	  appreciated	  Guthrie-­‐Shimizu’s	  comments	  on	  how	  the	  geopolitics	  around	  fishing	  fits	  into	  wider	  diplomatic	  history.	  The	  postwar	  expansion	  of	  both	  fisheries	  and	  whaling,	  involving	  Japan,	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  have	  had	  important	  environmental	  ramifications,	  yet	  fishing	  and	  whaling	  are	  studied	  separately.	  They	  are	  managed	  separately,	  and	  they	  tend	  to	  have	  separate	  scientific	  constituencies.	  But	  it	  is	  one	  ocean,	  and	  fish	  and	  whales	  interact.	  	  These	  post-­‐war	  expansions	  are	  the	  result	  of	  the	  same	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  goals,	  both	  at	  the	  national	  and	  international	  levels.	  The	  two	  sets	  of	  science	  need	  to	  be	  knit	  together	  at	  the	  policy	  level,	  by	  incorporating	  and	  creating	  context	  through	  the	  development	  of	  these	  histories.	  	  	  We	  are	  just	  starting	  to	  understand	  the	  environmental	  legacies	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  The	  fish	  and	  whales	  were,	  of	  course,	  important	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  but	  for	  Japan	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  fishing	  and	  whaling	  were	  also	  territorial	  claims,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  American	  naval	  superiority.	  Some	  scientists	  believe	  that	  industrial	  whaling	  in	  the	  North	  Pacific	  set	  up	  a	  legacy	  of	  sequential	  collapse;	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  great	  whales,	  the	  smaller	  but	  more	  deadly	  killer	  whales	  turned	  to	  preying	  on	  sea	  otters	  and	  sea	  lions,	  leading	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  some	  populations.17	  This	  analysis	  is	  controversial,	  especially	  among	  scientists.18	  But	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  fishing	  and	  whaling	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  the	  same	  Cold	  War	  imperatives.	  Geopolitics	  has	  environmental	  impacts.	  	  During	  my	  Ph.D.	  defense,	  Chandra	  Mukerji	  asked	  me	  about	  epistemic	  communities	  within	  fisheries	  science,	  a	  question	  that	  stopped	  me	  cold.	  It’s	  a	  question	  that	  I	  still	  have	  difficulty	  answering.	  Haas’	  definition	  is	  a	  fairly	  standard	  one	  (shared	  norms,	  values,	  notions	  of	  validity	  and	  a	  shared	  set	  of	  common	  practices).19	  There	  are	  many	  such	  groups	  within	  fisheries	  science.	  Wilbert	  Chapman	  was	  involved	  in	  setting	  up	  two	  marine	  study	  initiatives	  that	  exist	  to	  this	  day,	  CalCOFI,	  and	  Pacific	  Oceanic	  Fisheries	  Institute	  (POFI).	  Both	  are	  communities	  of	  scientists,	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  A.M.	  Springer,	  J.A.	  Estes,	  G.B.	  van	  Vliet,	  T.M.	  Williams,	  D.F.	  Doak,	  E.	  M.	  Danner,	  K.A.	  Forney,	  and	  B.	  Pfister.	  “Sequential	  megafaunal	  collapse	  in	  the	  North	  Pacific	  Ocean:	  An	  ongoing	  legacy	  of	  industrial	  whaling?”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  of	  America,	  100	  (21),	  Oct.	  14,	  2003,	  12223-­‐12228,	  12223.	  18	  Kevin	  Bailey,	  Billion-­‐Dollar	  Fish:	  The	  Untold	  Story	  of	  Alaska	  Pollock,	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2012,	  119.	  19	  Peter	  M.	  Haas,	  “Introduction:	  epistemic	  communities	  and	  international	  policy	  coordination,”	  International	  Organization,	  46(1),	  Winter,	  1992,	  1-­‐35.	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academia	  and	  management	  agencies.	  The	  science	  is	  debated.	  Results	  are	  published.	  The	  objective	  of	  both	  communities	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  knowledge	  and	  scientists	  have	  certainly	  used	  the	  data	  to	  make	  critical	  comments	  about	  management,	  science,	  and	  policies.	  	  	  But	  scientific	  communities	  have	  limited	  political	  power.	  It	  is	  only	  recently	  that	  dissent	  within	  the	  wider	  community	  of	  fisheries	  science	  has	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  comment.	  I	  think	  both	  my	  work	  and	  Kurkpatrick	  Dorsey’s	  recent	  book	  on	  the	  geopolitics	  of	  international	  whaling	  show	  that	  politics	  drives	  the	  science,	  at	  least	  where	  whales	  and	  fish	  are	  concerned.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  politics	  drives	  the	  science	  so	  thoroughly	  that	  the	  political	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  policy	  have	  been	  rendered	  invisible.	  The	  scientists	  involved	  are	  a	  lot	  more	  intent	  on	  reading	  the	  latest	  papers	  in	  the	  newest	  journals,	  rather	  than	  contemplating	  their	  own	  history—if	  a	  history	  of	  their	  portion	  of	  the	  profession	  was	  available	  to	  them	  and	  it	  generally	  is	  not.	  If	  they	  do	  search	  for	  the	  history	  within	  their	  own	  scientific	  papers,	  they	  will	  find	  neutral	  prose,	  presented	  with	  little	  or	  no	  context.	  Some	  scientists	  are	  writing	  excellent	  accounts	  of	  the	  history	  of	  fishing	  for	  certain	  species	  (the	  work	  of	  Robert	  S.	  Otto	  comes	  to	  mind,	  a	  retired	  federal	  biologist	  who	  has	  written	  a	  good	  account	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  king	  crab	  fishery	  in	  the	  North	  Pacific).20	  Such	  accounts	  are	  extremely	  valuable,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  place	  the	  development	  of	  fisheries	  into	  a	  broader	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  context.	  We	  need	  historians	  to	  do	  that,	  historians	  armed	  with	  lots	  of	  different	  sets	  of	  questions.	  	  There	  is	  a	  battle	  going	  on	  within	  fisheries	  science	  (and	  I	  use	  that	  term	  very	  broadly,	  oceanography,	  ecology,	  life	  in	  the	  ocean)	  about	  the	  objectives	  of	  management.	  Should	  it	  be	  MSY,	  admittedly	  cleaned	  up,	  softened,	  and	  seen	  as	  a	  range,	  not	  a	  fixed	  number,	  or	  a	  new	  policy	  that	  would	  pay	  attention	  to	  population	  structure	  of	  fish	  communities?	  	  	  	  In	  the	  Kuhnian	  model,	  I	  see	  fisheries	  science	  as	  ripe	  for	  an	  intervention	  from	  outside	  the	  science.	  The	  push	  to	  create	  marine	  reserves,	  for	  example,	  has	  come	  outside	  the	  management	  structure.	  Rather	  than	  an	  epistemic	  community	  of	  scientists,	  we	  need	  an	  epistemic	  community	  of	  citizens,	  invested	  in	  the	  health	  of	  the	  ocean	  resources	  at	  a	  local	  or	  regional	  level.	  	  	  Guthrie-­‐Shimuzu	  suggests	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  trace	  the	  exchanges	  of	  knowledge	  within	  fishery	  management	  forums.	  Fishery	  negotiators	  (who	  were	  sometimes	  scientists,	  sometimes	  not)	  were	  constrained	  by	  their	  policy	  constructs.	  The	  science	  was	  aimed	  at	  making	  the	  case	  to	  justify	  political	  objectives.	  Tracing	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Otto,	  S.	  Robert.	  "History	  of	  King	  Crab	  Fisheries	  with	  Special	  Reference	  to	  the	  North	  Pacific	  Ocean:	  Development,	  Maturity,	  and	  Senescence."	  In	  King	  Crabs	  of	  the	  World:	  Biology	  and	  
Fisheries	  Management,	  edited	  by	  Bradley	  G.	  Stevens,	  81-­‐138	  Boca	  Raton:	  CRC	  Press,	  2014.	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would	  be	  difficult.	  The	  official	  proceedings	  are	  written	  in	  dry,	  neutral	  language.	  It	  would	  take	  digging	  into	  the	  papers	  of	  participants	  to	  chart	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  arguments,	  re-­‐creating	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  decisions	  were	  made.	  Historians	  of	  science	  need	  diplomatic	  historians.	  	  The	  charge	  of	  scientific	  racism	  is	  indeed	  a	  serious	  one,	  as	  Poulsen	  notes.	  As	  Gutherie-­‐Simizu	  writes,	  there	  were	  degrees	  of	  racism,	  more	  towards	  the	  Japanese,	  but	  also	  a	  disdain	  for	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  Latin	  American	  scientists.	  There	  was	  enormous	  general	  racism	  against	  Asians	  on	  the	  West	  Coast,	  from	  Alaska	  to	  California,	  including	  British	  Columbia.	  The	  Japanese	  were	  the	  best	  fishermen	  and	  they	  provided	  cheap	  labor	  in	  the	  processing	  plants.	  They	  were	  regularly	  demonized	  in	  the	  pages	  of	  
Pacific	  Fisherman.	  Its	  publisher,	  Miller	  Freeman,	  was	  deeply	  racist;	  he	  collected	  Native	  American	  regalia	  and	  would	  dress	  in	  it	  and	  pretend	  to	  be	  a	  wooden	  Indian.	  I	  see	  the	  scientific	  racism	  as	  fitting	  into	  the	  wider	  analysis	  of	  masculine	  American,	  feminine	  Japan.	  The	  Japanese	  are	  not	  systematic	  and	  efficient,	  their	  focus	  was	  not	  on	  maximizing	  the	  catch,	  but	  as	  I	  see	  it,	  on	  fishing	  economically,	  to	  make	  money.	  The	  rhetoric	  about	  conservation,	  so	  prevalent	  in	  the	  American	  literature,	  seems	  to	  be	  absent	  in	  many	  of	  the	  Japanese	  policy	  papers	  I	  have	  read	  (in	  translation,	  I	  hasten	  to	  add).	  Decision	  on	  when	  and	  where	  to	  fish	  in	  the	  1930s	  were	  made	  by	  Diet.	  I	  think	  there	  is	  much	  work	  to	  be	  done	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  relationships	  between	  nation	  states	  and	  their	  fishing	  industries.	  	  	  Poulsen	  also	  asks	  what	  the	  “main	  driving	  forces”	  were	  in	  the	  dominance	  of	  MSY.	  It	  became	  dominant	  because	  it	  was	  backed	  by	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  and	  incorporated,	  in	  some	  fashion,	  in	  most	  of	  the	  international	  treaties	  that	  were	  signed	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  It	  is	  policy,	  not	  science,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  science	  fails.	  It	  is	  still	  the	  foundation	  of	  American	  fisheries	  management,	  and	  it	  keeps	  the	  focus	  on	  estimating	  harvest,	  rather	  than	  on	  population	  stability.	  It	  is	  declared	  to	  be	  the	  best	  available	  science,	  and	  indeed,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  was,	  when	  it	  was	  adopted,	  in	  1949.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  best	  science	  today,	  but	  shifting	  the	  policy	  means	  shifting	  the	  science,	  and	  a	  quagmire	  of	  a	  debate	  about	  something	  few	  people	  understand	  very	  clearly.	  This	  is	  a	  good	  place	  to	  drag	  in	  John	  Gullands’s	  definition	  of	  MSY:	  "A	  quantity	  that	  has	  been	  shown	  by	  biologists	  not	  to	  exist,	  and	  by	  economists	  to	  be	  misleading	  if	  it	  did	  exist.	  The	  key	  to	  modern	  fisheries	  management."21	  	  McEvoy	  also	  makes	  an	  interesting	  observation	  here	  that	  researcher	  positions	  tend	  to	  correlate	  with	  nationalities.	  Canadian	  scientists	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  harvest	  in	  fishery	  declines,	  while	  American	  scientists	  point	  to	  the	  role	  of	  environmental	  factors.	  Canadian	  scientists	  have	  been	  able	  to	  intervene	  politically	  to	  shape	  science;	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  make	  changes	  at	  the	  federal	  level,	  to	  implement	  license	  restrictions	  or	  to	  change	  harvest	  rates	  on	  long-­‐lived	  rockfish.	  (Unfortunately,	  it	  appears	  the	  federal	  model	  is	  easier	  to	  dismantle,	  but	  that	  is	  another	  story).	  Sidney	  Holt	  has	  also	  noted	  that	  European	  fisheries	  science	  is	  more	  interested	  in	  continuity	  and	  stability	  over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Roy	  Hilborn,	  from	  his	  introduction	  to	  Daniel	  Pauly’s	  On	  the	  Sex	  of	  Fish	  and	  the	  Gender	  of	  Scientists,	  1994.	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time,	  while	  Americans	  are	  interested	  in	  optimization	  of	  fishing	  through	  MSY.22	  These	  few	  examples	  illustrate	  the	  question	  of	  underlying	  ideologies	  around	  fisheries	  management.	  Jennifer	  Hubbard	  is	  doing	  some	  interesting	  work,	  looking	  at	  the	  role	  of	  economists	  within	  fisheries,	  and	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  the	  profession	  within	  the	  Canadian	  government.	  It	  would	  be	  good	  to	  investigate	  how	  fisheries	  science	  was	  created	  internationally.	  A	  project	  that	  I	  think	  is	  important	  would	  be	  trace	  the	  work	  of	  FAO,	  what	  countries	  were	  involved,	  what	  projects	  were	  started,	  what	  was	  the	  impact?	  	  As	  Chiarrapa	  notes,	  the	  antecedents	  for	  MSY	  go	  back	  to	  Locke	  and	  the	  Enlightenment.	  One	  area	  I	  wish	  somebody	  would	  consider	  is	  how	  the	  European	  focus	  on	  “rational	  harvest”	  somehow	  became	  “maximum	  harvest”	  in	  the	  New	  World.	  While	  scientists	  like	  to	  parse	  this	  and	  believe	  that	  the	  important	  word	  is	  sustained,	  as	  far	  as	  managers	  and	  the	  public	  goes,	  the	  important	  word	  in	  maximum.	  I	  also	  agree	  that	  the	  iconic	  image	  of	  a	  fisherman	  clouds	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  ruthless	  capitalism	  that	  rules	  the	  industry.	  These	  iconic	  images	  mask	  the	  role	  of	  government	  in	  expanding	  fisheries,	  and	  how	  government	  goals	  of	  open	  access	  actually	  diluted	  the	  ability	  of	  individual	  fishermen	  to	  make	  a	  living.	  Ideology	  again	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  within	  fisheries.	  While	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  rhetoric	  about	  fisheries	  being	  efficient,	  the	  main	  management	  tool	  has	  been	  creating	  inefficiencies	  to	  slow	  the	  catch	  and	  increase	  costs.	  Governments	  wanted	  open	  access,	  for	  reasons	  that	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  fish,	  and	  the	  policy	  contributed	  to	  poverty	  among	  many	  fishermen—poverty	  that	  they	  did	  not	  see	  as	  linked	  to	  government	  ideology.	  	  One	  thing	  I	  think	  a	  lot	  about,	  like	  Poulsen,	  is	  could	  it	  have	  developed	  differently?	  How	  important	  were	  the	  people?	  In	  this	  current	  work,	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  the	  development	  of	  subsidies	  around	  fishing,	  starting	  with	  the	  two	  places	  where	  fishing	  played	  a	  substantial	  role	  in	  the	  national	  economy,	  Japan	  and	  Iceland	  (I	  could	  also	  have	  looked	  at	  Norway	  but	  things	  are	  complicated	  enough	  with	  two	  countries).	  I	  argue	  that	  postwar	  fisheries	  grew	  so	  rapidly	  because	  of	  government	  money,	  which	  allowed	  boats	  to	  be	  built	  by	  the	  dozen	  and	  equipped	  with	  the	  latest	  electronic	  technology.	  Iceland	  fishermen	  go	  from	  hand-­‐lining	  in	  rowboats	  to	  setting	  records	  for	  the	  most	  fish	  caught	  in	  one	  day,	  in	  a	  couple	  of	  decades.	  	  	  	  Fishing	  is	  boom	  and	  bust;	  the	  government	  money	  was	  like	  heroin,	  fueling	  an	  enormous	  boom.	  Post-­‐war	  development	  would	  have	  been	  rapid,	  regardless	  of	  personalities.	  Geopolitically,	  fishing	  was	  a	  territorial	  claim	  and	  with	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  fishing	  was	  a	  proxy	  for	  other	  conflicts.	  Fishing	  was	  the	  key	  to	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  the	  Japanese	  empire	  and	  it	  was	  a	  way	  for	  the	  Soviets	  to	  challenge	  the	  American	  supremacy	  on	  the	  high	  seas.	  The	  formalization	  of	  research	  and	  development	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  fisheries,	  a	  role	  that	  is	  masked;	  most	  of	  the	  early	  research	  work	  is	  on	  increasing	  the	  catch.	  As	  Chiarappa	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Sidney	  Holt,	  “The	  notion	  of	  sustainability,”	  in	  Gaining	  Ground:	  In	  Pursuit	  of	  Ecological	  
Sustainability,	  ed.	  D.M.	  Lavigne,	  (Limerick:	  University	  of	  Limerick,	  2006),	  43-­‐82.	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astutely	  points	  out,	  scientists,	  politicians	  and	  the	  industry	  were	  all	  involved	  in	  rent-­‐seeking,	  which	  was	  fine	  until	  the	  stocks	  collapsed.	  	  	  That	  said,	  I	  think	  Chapman	  truly	  made	  a	  difference,	  because	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  vision,	  and	  because	  of	  his	  unique	  set	  of	  skills,	  not	  the	  least	  of	  which	  was	  his	  ability	  at	  self-­‐	  promotion.	  He	  assiduously	  cultivated	  his	  professional	  network,	  he	  knew	  everybody,	  and	  he	  was	  a	  skilled	  and	  quick	  writer.	  My	  favorite	  picture	  of	  Chapman	  comes	  in	  McEvoy’s	  book;	  he’s	  at	  SIO,	  in	  a	  sports	  shirt,	  smoking	  a	  cigar,	  leaning	  forward.	  Who	  would	  not	  want	  to	  talk	  to	  him?	  As	  oceanographer	  Alan	  Longhurst	  has	  written,	  Chapman	  understood	  more	  abut	  the	  fishing	  industry	  than	  anybody	  before	  or	  since.23	  	  	  His	  chief	  skills	  were	  not	  as	  a	  scientist,	  but	  as	  a	  lobbyist,	  as	  McEvoy	  points	  out.	  	  He	  worked	  unabashedly	  to	  expand	  American	  Manifest	  Destiny	  deep	  into	  the	  Pacific;	  his	  1949	  fisheries	  policy	  laid	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  Highly	  Migratory	  Tuna	  designation.	  	  Also	  remarkable	  was	  the	  breadth	  of	  his	  vision	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  expansion	  of	  fisheries	  science	  and	  oceanography.	  His	  vision	  resonated	  deeply	  with	  postwar	  American	  optimism,	  as	  McEvoy	  says.	  I	  believe	  he	  was	  sincere;	  again,	  as	  McEvoy	  observes,	  he	  was	  never	  troubled	  by	  the	  details,	  just	  the	  big	  picture,	  and	  he	  painted	  pictures	  that	  were	  bigger	  than	  most.	  	  Did	  Americans	  fail	  to	  stay	  abreast	  with	  the	  global	  trend	  towards	  catching	  and	  processing	  at	  sea,	  or	  did	  the	  industry	  “elect	  to	  channel	  its	  resources	  elsewhere	  by	  resorting	  to	  direct	  foreign	  investment	  into	  canning	  processing	  overseas?”	  There	  is	  always	  more	  money	  to	  be	  made	  fishing	  virgin	  stocks.	  The	  Americans	  followed	  the	  fish	  to	  the	  money,	  first	  to	  Peru	  and	  the	  anchovy	  fishery,	  then	  to	  the	  high-­‐seas	  tuna	  business.	  American	  political	  constructs,	  such	  as	  the	  highly	  migratory	  designation	  for	  tuna,	  ensured	  that	  Americans	  and	  Japanese	  would	  continue	  to	  pay	  a	  central	  role	  in	  management	  of	  these	  species,	  which	  live	  far	  outside	  the	  EEZ	  of	  both	  countries.	  Global	  capital	  was	  also	  quick	  to	  invest	  in	  American	  fisheries,	  most	  significantly	  Japanese	  money	  during	  the	  1960s	  in	  the	  development	  of	  surimi	  from	  Alaskan	  pollock,	  and	  Norwegian	  money	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  North	  Pacific	  trawl	  fleet	  during	  the	  1980s.	  It	  was	  only	  after	  1976	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  200-­‐mile	  limit,	  that	  American	  government	  money	  flowed	  into	  fisheries	  in	  the	  form	  of	  subsidies	  to	  build	  boats	  and	  processing	  plants,	  to	  “Americanize”	  the	  fisheries.	  	  I	  leave	  Canada	  in	  the	  capable	  hands	  of	  Jennifer	  Hubbard.	  There	  is	  indeed	  a	  high	  level	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Canada	  on	  fishery	  issues,	  except	  when	  they	  are	  fighting	  with	  each	  other	  over	  fishery	  issues,	  such	  as	  during	  the	  last	  round	  of	  negotiations	  on	  the	  Pacific	  Salmon	  Treaty.	  The	  Alaskans	  hammered	  Canadian	  salmon	  in	  the	  trans-­‐boundary	  rivers,	  while	  the	  West	  Coast	  Vancouver	  Island	  troll	  fleet	  hit	  the	  small	  remnant	  of	  Oregon	  wild	  coho,	  now	  on	  the	  Endangered	  Species	  list.	  	  It	  is	  indeed	  difficult	  to	  fit	  in	  all	  the	  nuances	  of	  this	  complex	  and	  tortuous	  policy	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construction.	  The	  science—that	  stocks	  were	  being	  driven	  to	  extremely	  low	  levels—was	  trumped	  by	  the	  politics	  and	  who	  was	  going	  to	  blink	  first—the	  Alaskans,	  the	  Canadians,	  or	  the	  Americans?	  Fishing	  is	  never	  just	  about	  fish.	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